



**\*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File\*** 0009-9



WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MID 912

22 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division,  
Special Staff

DISCUSSION

1. Psychological warfare problems of interest to the War Department have been the responsibility of the Propaganda Branch, G-2, WDGS, acting under the direct control of the A. C. of S., G-2, in accordance with instructions of the Deputy Chief of Staff. (Tab A) Under the provisions of JCS 224 Series, the Chief, Propaganda Branch also acts as the Army Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison with the Overseas Planning Board, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State. The Propaganda Branch also provides for AAF interest in psychological warfare in accordance with the decision of the D. C. of S. abolishing the AAF Psychological Warfare Service and transferring its personnel to the Propaganda Branch. (Tab B)

2. Prior to the establishment of the Propaganda Branch, psychological warfare problems were the responsibility of the following staff agencies:

World War I	- Psychologic Subsection, M.I. 2, Military Intelligence Division
1919-1941	- None
1941	- Special Studies Group - OASW and A.C. OF S., G-2
1942	- Psychological Warfare Branch, MIS
1943	- OPD Policy Section, Strategy and Policy Group

A brief summary of War Department participation in psychological warfare is attached as Tab C.

3. Although propaganda leaflets were employed by the Continental Forces in action against British troops at the Battle of Bunker Hill in 1775, and, in more modern times, an extensive propaganda effort was developed in World War I, yet no firm doctrine or determination of the proper role of psychological warfare in the military establishment had been developed by the War Department at the outbreak of World War II. As a result, civilian agencies were to a large extent relied upon to plan, develop and execute psychological warfare missions for the armed forces. Under Executive Order 9312, the Office of War Information was assigned responsibility for planning, development and execution of all

phases of the federal program of radio, press, publications, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information, except in Latin America, which was assigned to the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Programs of foreign propaganda in the theaters of operations were subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while those parts executed in theaters of military operations were subject to the control of the theater commander.

4. As a result, psychological warfare operations in the various theaters were to a large extent concerned with the integration and utilization of civilians who had been hastily trained and selected for this work by the OWI. In the absence of War Department doctrine or policy, various arrangements and agreements were made by the theater commanders concerning the degree of such utilization. In some theaters, notably SWPA, very little use was made of OWI civilians in the field, while in other areas, particularly those under SHANF control, extensive use was made in all operations, both strategic and tactical.

5. By military order of the Commander in Chief, dated 13 June 1942, as amended by Presidential Executive Order of 9 March 1943, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) was established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was assigned the mission of conducting secret operations within enemy countries and enemy-occupied or controlled countries for the purpose of executing morale subversion by means of covert or "black" propaganda, including false rumors, "freedom stations", false leaflets and false documents for undermining the morale of the enemy. Although OSS was organized on a military structure it did not have recognized status as an agency of the War Department, with a result that theater commanders were often reluctant to utilize its services. As a result, OSS operated only to a very limited extent in the Cincpac-Cincpos area, and not at all in the SWPA.

6. Should this nation ever have to face another world war, the greater totality which will undoubtedly characterize it will apply to the psychological as well as to the material means with which it is fought. In a contest in which the material forces were closely balanced, victory might well hinge upon our capacity to shake the determination of our enemies and to win the support of people very different from ourselves. Therefore, the War Department cannot afford to neglect the implementation of any means which would assist in the accomplishment of such objectives, and with the reorganization of the War Department, it appears pertinent to re-examine the status of psychological warfare within the General Staff.

7. Psychological warfare cannot be improvised. Rather it requires a continuous accumulation of pertinent facts, many of them of a technical nature, and a discerning evaluation of such facts by trained specialists, capable of following intently all developments in the field of mass education and mass information, as well as political and psychological techniques. Such studies, while relying to a certain extent on intelligence sources, are not properly within the role of

7. military intelligence, which is devoted principally to an estimate of the war-making capabilities of other nations. The need for such a group within the War Department has been recognized by the Army member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, who in a letter dated 22 December 1945, to the A. C. of S., OPD, stressed the importance of consolidating the lessons learned in World War II and establishing a small Psychological Warfare Branch in the War Department. (Tab D) This same need has also been recognized in the official reports of psychological warfare activities in all theaters of operations.

8. Field experience during World War II demonstrated that while psychological warfare was originally assigned to the various G-2 staff sections for development and implementation, the diverse character of the operations were such that the establishment of special staff sections was necessitated. As a result, in ETO, WFO, SWPA, and eventually in POA, Psychological Warfare Divisions or Branches were established and psychological warfare was recognized as an auxiliary operational weapon.

9. To insure complete exploitation of the potentials of psychological warfare, studies of a highly technical character must be vigorously pursued. These studies should include the development and utilization of airborne, rocket, and artillery propaganda-dispersing devices, public address systems, both air and ground types, and specialized morale deterioration devices. In addition, all technical improvements in such diverse fields as radio and television, printing and publishing, and motion pictures will require constant study and review. Furthermore, there must be sufficient experimentation in and development of such items to enable standardization and the establishment of approved tables of equipment and channels of supply.

10. Analysis of the responsibilities of the Intelligence Division indicates that it is particularly concerned with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence and with security of information. Although relying on intelligence for propaganda purposes during wartime, psychological warfare is an operational function involving not only military intelligence, but strategic developments, political forces, historic and ethnic backgrounds of people, and diplomacy on the highest level. However, the diverse and technical character of its operations and responsibilities does not appear to be a logical responsibility of the Operations Division.

11. In the event of a future emergency, while overall political and psychological warfare policies will stem from the White House and the State Department, the existence of a nuclear organization within the War Department possessing a complete plan for military psychological warfare and the technical means of implementation, would avoid the situation of World War II wherein theater commanders had thrust upon them civilian agencies to conduct military psychological warfare within their theaters, with resultant conflict of authority and lack of control over training standards and performance. Furthermore, a psychological warfare organization on the Special Staff level would

also be capable of planning, executing and implementing subversive morale operations, thus providing a unified structure within the War Department for the conduct of all phases of psychological warfare.

#### ACTION RECOMMENDED

It is recommended that the Psychological Warfare Division, War Department Special Staff, be established with responsibilities and functions substantially as outlined in APPENDIX A.

#### CONCURRENCES

D of I	(	)
CAD	(	)
OPD	(	)
G-3	(	)

#### 5 Incls

1. Appendix A
2. Tab A. MID Memo no. 78
3. Tab B. Memo for the D.C. of S.
4. Tab C. Brief of WD participation  
in P.W.
5. Tab D. Letter from Maj Gen Lemnitzer